Introduction
Developing a comprehensive global warming and greenhouse gas policy has been difficult for the USA. While many other developed countries have implemented greenhouse gas initiatives, the USA became mired in the debate over the actual existence of global warming (McCright & Dunlap 2003) , the prudence of developing policy in the perceived lack of scientific information in support of global warming (Leiserowitz 2006) , and the ways to go about reducing greenhouse gas emissions (McCarl & Schnieder 2000; Rose & Oladosu 2002) . Indeed, while global warming was largely accepted by the scientific community by the early 1990s (IPCC 1992) throughout much of the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations (IPCC 1995 (IPCC , 2001 IPCC 2007a IPCC , 2007b , no serious efforts to develop national greenhouse gas policies emerged. Several US leaders, including leaders in the executive and legislative branches of the government, doubted the existence of global warming and used evidence outside mainstream scientific inquiry to justify their position (Armitage 2005) .
Thus, the approach taken by the USA, until the election of President Obama, was largely one of debate with little policy development.
During this period, the absence of leadership at the national level led to a number of innovative initiatives by individuals, state and local governments, non-profit current literature in that it summarizes key actions taken within the national policy framework and synthesizes climate policy options within the US government system.
Greenhouse gas litigation (judicial branch)
Many cases have been brought before the courts that attempted to address problems associated with greenhouse gas litigation (Gerrard 2007) . They can be divided into categories of law: federal statutory law; challenges to individual projects using federal and state statutory law; vehicle emissions standards; common law claims with injunctive relief; and common law claims with financial relief (Arnold & Porter LLP 2011) . Each category will be discussed briefly to highlight the major cases and their outcome.
Federal statutory law
Lawsuits have been brought forward that utilize the provisions of The Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Global Change Research Act, the Alternative Motor Fuels Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Energy Policy Act to test current practices of the US government actions within the courts. Perhaps the most tested aspect of federal statutory law is the failure of government to regulate greenhouse gases. Many of the proceedings have sought to compel the government to use its statutory power to reduce or prevent injury from climate change caused by greenhouse gas emissions. Bringing such a claim to court is difficult in that the litigant must demonstrate legal standing to bring the case (that is, they must experience direct damages) and they must be able to demonstrate the link between inaction by the government and resultant damage.
The most successful of these cases is Massachusetts et al. v. US EPA et al. (United States Supreme Court 2006) . In this case, the state of Massachusetts and other petitioners brought forward a lawsuit to require the US EPA to regulate greenhouse gases from tailpipe emissions to eliminate future damages. The case challenged US EPA's contention that it did not have congressional mandate to regulate greenhouse gases. In addition, the US EPA's stated policy was that even if it was decided that they had regulatory authority over greenhouse gas regulation, they would opt not to regulate the gases due to the unique nature of the pollution. They also stated that the scientific link between greenhouse gases and global warming was not clear. Eventually, the case was heard in the US Supreme Court where it was decided by a 5 to 4 majority that US EPA was required to regulate greenhouse gases. 
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Challenges to individual projects
Another form of greenhouse gas litigation is in the form of challenges to individual projects. Most of these cases have challenged the construction of coal-fired power plants. These cases are challenging for applicants in that they must demonstrate direct injury to an individual or property owner due to global warming, and they must prove that the power plant would be responsible, in part, for climate change. The political context for these lawsuits is often brought into question by respondents. Defendants have argued that within the present political situation, when there is no guidance from the US government on greenhouse gas issues, they should not be regulated by the courts. the site was not permitted correctly since it was going to emit more than 100 tons per year of a regulated pollutant. In addition, they argued that the gases emitted, particularly 1-chloro-1, 1-difluoroethane (HCFC-142b), were greenhouse gases and ozone depleting substances that could prove harmful to residents in the community in a variety of ways.
Owens Corning argued, in part, to dismiss the case on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not have standing and that there was no injury caused by global warming to the litigants.
Interestingly, the court noted that even though greenhouse gases from various sources are mixed in the atmosphere, local sources do contribute to local impacts. Thus, the emissions of one particular plant, combined with all other emissions around the world can impact local conditions such as sea level or snow pack. Therefore, the individual source should be regulated to reduce local impacts, even though there are multiple sources.
State vehicle emissions standards
Another branch of greenhouse gas law focuses on controlling emissions standards of vehicles. In recent years, there has been much focus on federal corporate average fuel emissions (CAFE) standards for auto emission requirements for auto manufacturers (Austin & Dinan 2005 (Grynbaum 2011 ).
The case ended up in the US Supreme Court that essentially confirmed that the Federal Government was the only organization that can set CAFE standards. Thus, New York City was not allowed to enact a hybrid-only rule for cabs.
Common law claims with injunctive relief
Another avenue for greenhouse gas litigation is the use of common law claims, in some cases involving a request for injunctive relief. petitioned the court to require US EPA to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to address health threats from global warming. However, the court found that the plaintiff's injuries were not enough to grant him standing to bring this suit.
Common law claims with financial relief
One of the most controversial areas of greenhouse gas litigation has been the seeking of damages due to the result of greenhouse gas emissions. There is growing evidence that some communities have been deleteriously impacted due to global warming (Patz et al. 2005) . According to an abundance of national and international law (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 1992), a polluter is responsible for damages caused as a direct result of the pollution. However, greenhouse gas emissions and concomitant global warming are dispersed across the planet from multiple sources in all countries of the world. Thus, the challenge is to show the direct link between global warming and associated damages. Nevertheless, some cases have tested the courts to seek damage claims against producers of petroleum products. The line of reasoning for this argument is similar to that used in the tobacco lawsuits, which claimed that tobacco companies continued to produce a product that they knew was harmful to human health.
Therefore, a key aspect in any lawsuit of this type is that the litigant must demonstrate that the petroleum companies knew of damages they were inflicting on the environment through the burning of their product.
Perhaps the best-known case that tested this area of law is Kivalina v Exxon et al. The community was a traditional fishing village with less than one hundred households.
In the last decade, the ice surrounding the village began to disappear, leaving the shore susceptible to wave erosion, particularly during fall and spring storms when sea ice, which normally would be present, was absent. The village sued a number of petroleum producers and energy producing companies for the costs associated with moving the village, arguing that they were partly responsible for past and ongoing contributions to global warming and that the defendants were responsible for perpetuating a conspiracy to suppress the knowledge of a link between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming.
As noted, the lawsuit had several political hurdles, and it was dismissed by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The court decided this case on two grounds. First, the court argued that the case dealt with matters that have not been decided politically. The court concluded that the legislative and executive branches of government were the best avenues for developing policy on greenhouse gases. In addition, the court noted that everyone on the planet is in some way responsible for greenhouse gas emissions and that it is difficult to develop sound policy under such circumstances. In addition, the court ruled that the village did not have standing to bring the case since the pollution could not be 'fairly traceable' to the defendants. In other words, the court felt that there must be more direct proof that the emissions put out by the defendants had a direct link to the coastal erosion that caused the damage to the village. The court felt that the links were too weak to make the defendants responsible for the damages to Kivalina. The plaintiff in this case has appealed the decision. It seems apparent that the village was destroyed as a result of changing temperatures in the Arctic region. The question is whether the courts will assert a link between emissions and global warming and assign damage recovery. The implications of this type of lawsuit are significant. If won, it would set a precedent for financial recovery caused by greenhouse gas emissions and an onslaught of court cases would be filed that could potentially harm the energy industry and its linked economies.
Presidential action and the US EPA (executive branch)
As introduced in the previous section, the Supreme Court ruling from Massachusetts v.
US EPA resulted in authorizing the US EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from To date, the President has made great strides in following through on his commitment. First, rulemaking to regulate emissions from stationary sources began by setting thresholds for greenhouse gas emissions and permitting requirements for new and existing industrial facilities (known as the Tailoring Rule). The ruling will cover approximately 70 percent of industrial facilities (i.e., electricity providers, refineries, and other high energy users). Second, the US EPA finalized a mandatory ruling whereby facilities in selected sectors that emit more than 25,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents (mtCO 2 e) must publicly monitor and report greenhouse gas emissions annually beginning in 2010. A carbon dioxide equivalent is a standardized term used to account for all non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases in the reporting of emissions in a regulatory scheme. Non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases are converted to equivalents by multiplying by its respective global warming potential (IPCC 2007a (IPCC , 2007b . This ruling will cover about 85 percent of greenhouse gas emission sources.
Third, a final ruling was announced in April 2010 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from new cars and light trucks. Finally, a number of voluntary programs have been continued and proposed to aid other organizations in measuring and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
The Obama Administration's agenda and strong actions taken at the US EPA are thought to have spurred Congress into drafting comprehensive energy and climate policy (see discussion below). While the US EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions using traditional 'command and control' regulatory methods, many think this method is inadequate to effectively address the complexity of climate change. Additionally, US EPA regulation does not provide incentives and mandates to transition the USA away from fossil fuels and towards clean energy or for adaptation planning. Additionally, the US EPA is not equipped to address higher consumer costs of electricity and fuels or the potential loss of industry to developing countries. According to a recent study, a consensus (that is, 91.6 percent) among economic experts is that market-based mechanisms such as a carbon tax or cap and trade program is the 'preferred or strongly preferred' approach over traditional regulation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and that significant risks to specific sectors in the USA and abroad exists if emissions are not reduced (Holladay, Jonathan, & Swchwarz 2009 ). It appears that neither the Presidential Administration nor any one Federal Agency (for example, the US EPA or the US DOE) is fully equipped to implement a market-based system. This approach, or a carbon tax, are more suited to be legislated through congressional action. Therefore, greenhouse gas litigation, Presidential action, and US EPA action have effectively moved Congress to move beyond debate and begin to take action to enact legislation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Congressional national climate policy (legislative branch)
While a national climate policy was introduced in former Congresses prior to the Obama administration, these bills have not progressed in any significant manner.
However, due to actions taken by the courts, President Obama's initiatives, a democrat- Each section contains a summary table of the major provisions followed by a discussion of key provisions from Waxman-Markey. Where different, the Kerry-Boxer bill provisions are also discussed.
Clean energy (Title I)
Since consumption of fossil fuel energy represents the majority of greenhouse gas emission sources in the United States, transitioning to clean energy sources would significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Both the Waxman-Markey and KerryBoxer bills include policies and programs designed to promote the development and rapid deployment of clean energy. Table 1 provides a summary of the key clean energy provisions of the Waxman-Markey bill:
Key Provisions o Establishes a nationwide Combined Efficiency and Renewable Electricity Standard (CERES)
o Establishes the supply targets (6% supply in 2012 and is gradually increased to 20% in 2039) o Establishes the breakdown of supply (¾ from renewable energy and ¼ supply from energy efficiency) o Establishes a Federal Renewable Energy Credit (REC) program o Spurs R&D and the rapid commercialization of carbon capture and storage (CCS) from the combustion of coal o Incentivizes the transition to the large-scale electrification of vehicles o Establishes state accounts to distribute emission allowances to be used to fund energy projects o Improves the distribution of clean energy with Smart Grid technology and transmission planning o Establishes and funds research, education, and training facilities (i.e., Energy Innovation Hubs and Centers for Energy and Environmental Knowledge and Outreach) o Establishes revolving loans to fund research of advanced technologies as well as nuclear o Requires miscellaneous studies, determinations, and new agency development While the Senate version would encourage more states to develop an RPS, a nationwide system would be a more comprehensive approach and would require that all states participate, thus creating equitable solutions in transitioning towards clean energy in the country.
Both bills are full of provisions to improve our current electricity production in this country, particularly coal. For example, both bills will require coal-fired power plants to meet performance standards with targets of 65 percent greenhouse gas reduction for plants permitted after 2020. The bills also provide for significant research to advance carbon capture and sequestration technology. Both bills have provisions to increase electrical capacity, including the large-scale electrification of vehicles, Smart Grid, and Transmission Technology. The Waxman-Markey bill only briefly mentions nuclear energy under the heading of 'Advanced Technology,' while the Kerry-Boxer bill included more provisions for the nuclear industry, including additional training for the nuclear workforce and research and development for nuclear facilities.
Energy efficiency (Title II)
Both bills provide for policies whose goals are to improve energy efficiency in the built environment as well as to improve transportation efficiencies. Table 2 provides a summary of the key provisions contained in Title II of the Waxman-Markey bill. As stated in Table 2 , the Waxman-Markey bill stipulates an initial 30 percent improvement of energy efficiency in buildings with an ultimate goal of achieving 'zero-net-energy' consumption. The bill proposes to achieve these goals through the development of stringent building standards and incentives. The Kerry-Boxer bill differs in that it does not specify energy efficiency targets, but rather assigns that responsibility to the US EPA administrator to establish beginning in the year 2014. The Waxman-Markey bill is far more aggressive with immediate targets and an ultimate goal of zero energy consumption. In addition, the Waxman-Markey bill contains a national energy efficiency goal that stipulates an overall 2.5 percent improvement by 2012, a provision that is absent in the Kerry-Boxer bill. The Waxman-Markey bill would require that greenhouse gas emissions standards be set for new heavy-duty and off-road engines and vehicles within three model years commencing four years after bill enactment, a provision that is absent in the KerryBoxer bill. However, both bills will require that national transportation greenhouse gas reduction goals be established within 18 months of enactment of the bill. Lastly, both bills contain a number of other incentive programs as well as investment in research, technology advancement, and education.
Key Provisions
Reducing global warming pollution (Titles III and V)
The third title establishes a national Cap and Trade Program that includes greenhouse gas emission reduction targets and flexible compliance mechanisms for covered entities.
Title V addresses carbon offset projects related to forestry and agriculture and has been included in this section because offsets are one of the flexible mechanisms included in the Cap and Trade Program. For both bills, the greenhouse gas reduction target begins at 3 percent of 2005 levels by 2012 and then is ratcheted up to 83 percent by 2050. The Kerry-Boxer bill has the same beginning and end targets, but has different interim targets. Both bills allow two billion carbon offsets to meet the overall reduction target; however, Waxman-Markey allows for one billion carbon offsets originating from international projects whilst Kerry-Boxer limits offsets to one-half billion. Both bills lay out detailed rules for the implementation of a cap and trade program including how allowances will be distributed and how the program and markets will be regulated and enforced. An important provision in both bills dictates how revenue generated from the sale or distribution of emission allowances must be passed through to the consumer to offset the higher cost of energy.
This provision will help alleviate hardship to those that are most affected by higher electricity costs, specifically low-income residential consumers. Standards and rules will be promulgated to regulate greenhouse gases in non-covered sectors, which would include greenhouse gas sources that fall below the threshold and sectors that have the potential to enhance carbon sequestration, such as forestry and agriculture. Both bills outline how the cap and trade program will be strictly monitored to ensure real and additional greenhouse gas emission reductions. Additionally, significant portions of generated funds from the program will be directed to various incentive programs, adaptation programs, research, and education.
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Clean energy transition plan (Title IV)
Title IV outlines a transition plan that would move America towards a clean energy economy. The Waxman-Markey bill contains rebates to American industry to ensure that they remain competitive in the global markets and that industry 'leakage' does not occur (that is, industry is not exported overseas). In addition to standard rebates for all consumers dictated in Title III, additional energy refunds will be given to low-income residents and specific industries that will be the hardest hit from increased energy costs.
Both bills establish programs to train workers to enter the green workforce and help workers that might lose their jobs as a result of the transition. The bill also provides assistance to developing countries to facilitate the transition to clean energy. Lastly, both bills have significant provisions to prepare for domestic and international adaptation that require state plans that not only address the direct impacts from climate change, but also address public health and natural resources.
Discussion and conclusions
The use of the court systems to attempt to change environmental policy is not new.
Until recently, the lack of leadership in the executive and legislative bodies in solving the problems associated with climate change left little recourse but the courts for those concerned with the impact of global warming. Several court cases, particularly
Massachusetts v US EPA, forced the government to address climate change within the executive branch through US EPA regulation. The legislative branch has been slower to act. The 111 th Congress acted largely due to the pressures from the executive branch and the outcome of judicial court cases, while the 112 th Congress is acting to uses its regulatory power to attempt to repeal both executive and judicial action.
Clearly, the fate of national climate legislation is unclear at best. 'Institutional gridlock' appears to be the roadblock that may thwart federal legislative action on climate change (Byrne et al. 2007) . In short, it is usually easier to prevent legislation than it is to pass it.
In the 111 th Congress, this gridlock, along with the untimely loss of the democratic super-majority (from the replacement of Senator Kennedy's seat), a troubled economy, and an exhaustive healthcare debate very likely prevented legislative action from occurring. And now, the GOP-led 112 th Congress is using the economy as a major argument to pass legislation to stop regulation of greenhouse gases altogether (Koch 2011 ).
Yet, the national climate change policy passed in the House of Representatives (Waxman-Markey bill) and proposed in the Senate (Kerry-Boxer bill) provides a comprehensive approach to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, improve energy efficiency, provide incentives to develop clean energy, and plan for the transition to a clean energy economy. This national climate policy includes clear greenhouse gas reduction targets with a timeline and provides for flexible compliance mechanisms for covered sectors to comply with the proposed legislation. Economists nearly all agree that a national climate policy that utilizes cap and trade is the lowest-cost approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the United States (Chettiar & Schwartz 2009 ).
Cap and trade programs for other pollutants (for example, acid rain) have been shown to be an effective and fair approach to address the problem. Additionally, cap and trade programs can be implemented at relatively lower costs than traditional 'command and control' regulations because covered sectors can select the most cost effective solution to meet its compliance target. However, some economists favor a carbon tax because they believe that a carbon tax would be simpler and quicker to implement (Avi-Yonah & Ulmann 2009). Regardless of the approach, neither market-based policy instruments are anywhere near implementation through legislative means, and neither approach is being considered by the US EPA under the current Clean Air Act initiatives.
As discussed above, the President has issued Executive Orders to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within federal agencies. He could exercise the same power to set greenhouse gas reduction targets that are within the jurisdiction of the executive branch. Past presidents have often used this power to enact policy and strengthen their administrative powers (Mayer 1999) . However, the authority to implement such a comprehensive policy would be limited to the executive branch and would likely be challenged for its constitutionality and statutory authority in the courts.
Neither the courts nor the President have the ability or clear authority to implement a comprehensive cap and trade program that includes incentives for clean energy and a plan to transition American toward a carbon constrained economy that congressional legislation outlined in its bills. In the absence of such legislation, the US EPA has set into motion significant and binding regulation of greenhouse gases. Since legislation was not enacted, the US EPA regulation is the only real US greenhouse gas policy and is in danger of being stopped in its tracks if the GOP is successful with legislation (i.e., if the Upton Bill passes in the Senate). While the legislative and executive branches are the best places to resolve political national issues like management of greenhouse gases and associated climate change, the courts have as of late been one way to influence greenhouse gas policy. Massachusetts et al. v . US EPA directly resulted in the development of the Endangerment Finding and the pending regulations of greenhouse gas emissions by the US EPA. The lack of a clear legislative greenhouse gas policy weakens the US EPA's regulatory authority and puts many issues such as transitioning to clean energy and implementing a cap and trade program in limbo, particularly given the recent congressional effort to limit EPA's authority over greenhouse gas emissions.
Even in light of the conclusion that greenhouse gases may be regulated regardless of Congressional action, detractors of any national climate policy remain focused on continuing the debate on whether climate change is real thereby attempting to delay meaningful national policy. For example, a recent controversy, referred to as 'ClimateGate,' whereby a set of emails and files that apparently point out flaws in a small set of climate-change research has been used by advocates of climate policy to cast doubt with the US public (Fahrenthold & Eilperin 2009 ), even though US government scientists and the rest of the climate community say that the emails/files do nothing to negate the overwhelming conclusion that global climate change is real.
Hopefully, the US public and Congressional policymakers can move beyond this debate and if nothing else understand that time is not a luxury that we can afford and that the window of opportunity to mitigate climate change in a cost-effective manner may be closing (Holladay et al. 2009 ).
